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KENTUCKY LAW Jou[ AL
DEBTOR EXEMPTIONS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY-
PROPOSALS FOR MODERNIZATION
Exemption statutes have been enacted in all fifty states. Two of
the most common, wage and personal property exemptions, provide
many debtors with some insulation from the harshness of creditor
executions and bankruptcy proceedings.1 It is the purpose of this note
to make a brief analysis of these two exemptions in all the states, to
analyze the Kentucky statute while demonstrating a need for its
reform, and to recommend some possible solutions of the problems
involved. Procedural aspects of the statutes as well as their judicial
consrtuction are without the scope of the discussion. Rather, what
follows considers only their actual wording and provisions.
TIE STATUtEs i OTR IJEISDICrIONS
A classification has been made which encompasses tvo chief
considerations. One is concerned with the requirements some debtors
must satisfy to be able to claim the exemption, while the other con-
siders what is exempted and the method employed to provide it.
Basically, there are at least three express requirements that have
been adopted by various states. These may require that the debtor
or his family be a resident in the state, that the debtor be the head
of a family or a householder, or that the debtor show by an affidavit
or otherwise that the exemption is necessary for the use of his family.
This latter requirement is peculiar to wage statutes.
Fifteen personal property exemption statutes apply only to resident
debtors.2 Six other states require the debtor to be a head of a family3
or a householder,4 but make no specific provision for single persons.
In addition, three states have both residency and family requirements
without specifically extending protection to single personsY In all
other jurisdictions, including those with a residency requirement,
single persons are afforded protection.
111 U.S.C. § 24 (1958).2 Ala. Code tit. 7, §§ 628-29 (1958); Ark. Const. art. 9, §§ 1-2; Del. Code
Ann. tit. 10, § 4902 (1953); Fla. Const. art. 107 § 1 (1961); Idaho Code Ann.
§ 11-205 (1948); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-8501 (Burns 1946); Iowa Code Ann. § 627.6
1950); Kan. Gen. Laws Ann. § 60-8505 (1949); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A-17-19
1952); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 31, § 1 (Supp. 1957); S.C. Code § 34-41 (1952);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-201 (1955); Va. Code Ann. § 34-4 (1953); W. Va. Code
Ann. § 3897 (1961); Wyo. Stat. tit. 1, §§ 1-504 to 507 (1957).3 Fla. Const. art. 10, § 1 (1961); Ga. Code Ann. § 51-101 (1937); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 25-1552 (1956); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A-17-19 (1952); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 245-1 (1953); Va. Code Ann. § 34-4 (1953).
4 Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-350 (Burns 1946).5 Fla. Const. art. 107 § 1 (1961); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-3501 (Burns 1946); Va.
Code Ann. § 34-4 (1953).
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Directing attention toward the wage statutes, we find that sixteen
of these have a residency requirement, but only ten6 require the debtor
to be the resident. The other six require that there be a family
resident in the state.7 Five of these states with a residency requirement
also specifically require the debtor to be the head of a family,8 while
four states have this latter requirement alone.9 Twelve other states
require the debtor to show by affidavit or otherwise that he is the head
of a family and that the exemption he claims is necessary for the use
of his family.'0 Thus, a total of twenty-one jurisdictions have no
specific provision affording protection to single persons. Lastly, a total
of eleven states have both residency and family requirements."
In light of the above, it is obvious that the statutes are diverse.
This fact becomes clearer when the second major consideration con-
cerning the substance and structure of the statutes is examined. How-
ever, since there is such diverseness involved, only a skeletal presenta-
tion will be made.
The personal property statutes may be classified into three groups:
(1) those which exempt an enumeration of specific items; (2) those
which exempt any item of the debtor's choice up to a specific dollar
value; and (3) those which exempt certain enumerated items plus
what the debtor may choose up to a prescribed dollar value. The
great majority of the states have statutes of the group (1) type, but
similarity terminates at this point, as invariably they include different
qualifications. The most common are monetary, numerical, and time
6 Ala. Code tit. 7, § 630 (1958); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 30-207 (1962); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 10, § 4913 (1953); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 222.11 (1961); Idaho Code Ann.
§ 11-205 (1948); Kan. Gen. Laws Ann. § 60-3494 (1949); Mo. Stat. Ann.§ 525.030 (1952); N.D. Century Code Ann. § 32-09-02 (1960); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 26-207 (1955); Va. Code Ann. § 34-4 (1953).
7Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-1126 (1956); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 851(1960); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090 (h) (1957); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 26-2-27 (Supp.
1957); Utah Code Ann. § 78-28-1 (7) (1953); Wyo. Stat. tit. 1, § 1-422 (1957).8 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 222.11 (1961); Mo. Stat. Ann. § 525.030 (1952); N.D.
Century Code Ann. § 32-09-02 (1960); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 26-2-27 (Supp. 1957);
Va. Code Ann. § 34-4 (1953).
9111. Ann. Stat. ch. 62, § 14 (Smith-Hurd 1951); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-3501(Burns 1946); Iowa Code Ann. § 627.10 (Supp. 1961); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1558
(1956).10,Jaska Stat. § 9.35.080 (1962); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-1126 (1956);
Idaho Code Ann. § 11-205 (7) (1948); Kan. Gen. Laws Ann. § 60-3494 (1949);
Mont. Rev. Code § 93-5816 (1947); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090 (h) (1957); N.C.
Gen. Stat § 1-362 (1953); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 23.180 (1962); S.D. Code § 33.2404(Supp. 1960); Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-1 (7) (1953); Wash. Rev. Code §
7.32.280 (1956); Wyo. Stat. tit. 1, § 1-422 (1957).
"1Ariz. Rev. Stat Ann. § 33-1126 (1956); Fla. Stat. Ann. 222.11 (1961);
Idaho Code Ann. § 11-205 (7) (1948); Kan. Gen. Laws Ann. § 60-3494 (1949);
Mo. Stat. Ann. § 525.030 (1952); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090 (h) (1957); N.D.
Century Code Ann, § 32-09-02 (1960); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 26-2-27 (Supp. 1957);
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-1 (7) (1953); Va. Code Ann. § 34-4 (1953); Wyo.
Stat. tit. 1, § 1-422 (1957).
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limitations upon the items enumerated. In addition some of the
statutes in group (1) provide different exemptions for those with a
family. Others provide alternatives from which the debtor may choose.
Texas and Illinois have statutes illustrative of this, as the former has
separate sections pertaining to those with a family and single persons's
while the latter provides alternatives from which the debtor may
choose.'8
The states in group (2) have ceilings which fall within a minimum
allowance of one hundred dollars in one state14 to a maximum of 1600
dollars in another.15 Here distinctions have been made between those
with a family and single persons. For example, South Carolina allows
heads of families a five hundred dollar exemption while single persons
may only retain personal property not exceeding three hundred dollars
in value.'( The group (3) states reflect a more liberal policy than the
group (2) states by exempting essential items in addition to the dollar
value ceiling. A possible reason for such a statute could be the policy
of insuring retention of certain essential items which the debtor would
not see fit to withhold in exercising his privilege to choose. Under the
group (3) statute the debtor chooses what he desires, but certain
essential items are automatically exempt. Pennsylvania10 7 exemplifies
this, as it exempts personal property not exceeding three hundred
dollars in value plus all wearing apparel, bibles, and school books.
It is evident that to name every different item exempted in all the
states would be a herculean task. However, analysis reveals that there
exist among the statutes at least two basic similarities of a substantive
nature. One is the recurring presence of the same items. Among the
most prevalent are wearing apparel, various furniture, bibles, church
pews, burial lots, agricultural implements, domestic animals, and many
others. The other similarity is that some of the items exempted
reflect the geographical location of the state. For example, one would
expect to and does find that Nevada exempts mining equipment'8
while Massachusetts exempts fishing boats.' 9
The wage statutes may also be classified into three groups: (1)
those which exempt a certain amount or percentage of the debtor's
wages; (2) those which exempt different amounts above and below
a prescribed number of dollars; and (3) those which specifically
12Tex. Stat. Ann. art. 3832 and 3835.
1 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 52, § 13 (Smith-Hurd 1951).
.4Md. Code Ann. art. 83, § 8 (1957).
15 Ga. Code Ann. § 51-101 (1937).16 S.C. Code § 34-41 (1952).
'7Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2161 (Purdon's 1951).
18Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090 (e) (1957).
19 Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 235, § 34 (1956).
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prohibit any creditor from proceeding against the debtor's wages for
the satisfaction of his claim. As was true regarding the personal
property statutes, there are several qualifications to this general
scheme.
The group (1) statutes are almost uniformly qualified by a time
limit. In many cases this consists of exempting the wages due for
certain periods "next preceding the levy of execution." Their effect is
to exempt as much of the wages due as the statute allows for a
stipulated period of time prior to the levy of execution.20 These periods
range in length from thirty days in Arizona2' to three months in
Oklahoma.22 The time limit found in other statutes may be based upon
a week23 or even a day's time.24 Further, the group (1) statutes may
include a qualification based upon marital status. Colorado for
example, exempts seventy per cent of the wages of a person with a
family while a single person enjoys only a thirty per cent execption.2 5
Iowa has recently adopted a novel approach by exempting thirty-five
dollars per week plus an additional three dollars per week for each
dependent child.2 6 Other states employ still another qualification by
providing maximum and minimum limits of exemption. But even here
there is variation, as there may be only a minimum27 or a maximum 28
limit, or a provision which combines both.2 9
The statutes in groups (2) and (3) are few in number. Those in
group (2) exempt diverse amounts or percentages above and below
the stated dollar amount, and at least one includes a minimum and
maximum qualification.30 Those in group (3), which totally frustrate
creditor efforts to satisfy their claim through wages, are the result of
constitutional provisions in two states3' and legislative enactment in
the others.32
A comparison of the net amount exempted by the various statutes
does not result in exemptions of the same amount over identical or
nearly identical periods of time. Consequently, the provisions of the
wage statutes offer an even sharper contrast of substantive difference.
2 0 Johnson v. Williams, 235 Iowa 688, 17 N.W.2d 405 (1945).21 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 83-1126 (1956).
22 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 851 (1960).23 Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 246, § 28 (Supp. 1962).24 Ga. Code Ann. § 46-208 (Supp. 1961).25 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 77-13-4 (Supp. 1960).20 Iova Code Ann. § 627.10 (Supp. 1961).
27 Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-1 (7) (1953).
2 8 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 23.180 (1962).2 0 Va. Code Ann. § 34-29 (Supp. 1962).




Montana, for example, exempts all wages forty-five days next pre-
ceding the levy of execution,33 while Washington exempts twenty
dollars per week or eighty dollars per month.3 4 The conclusion to be
drawn is that, while it is conceivable that a person in Montana might
earn only eighty dollars every thirty days, this would be the exception
rather than the rule, and thus debtors enjoy a more substantial
exemption every month in Montana than they do in Washington. The
same conclusion is reached as to Wyoming, where fifty per cent of
the wages for sixty days next preceding the levy of execution are
exempt. 35 The Washington exemption for the Wyoming period would
be one hundred sixty dollars and this would be less than the fity per
cent exemption in Wyoming, in the great majority of instances, over
the same period.
It should also be noted that, even when statutes employing the
same methods are compared, the differences remain. Oregon 0 and
Alaska,3 7 for example, both exempt a dollar amount of the wages
earned thirty days next preceding the levy of execution. However, the
former exempts only one hundred seventy-five dollars of these while
the latter exempts three hundred dollars.
THE KENTUCKY STATUTE
Our statute provides.
The following property of a person with a family resident in this state is
exempt from execution, attachment, distress or free-bill:
(1) Two work beasts, or one work beast and one yoke of oxen; two
plows and gear; one wagon, cart, or dray and gear, two axes, three hoes,
one spade, one shovel; two cows and calves; beds, bedding, and furniture
sufficient for family use, one loom and spinning wheel and pair of cards;
all of the spun yam and manufactured cloth manufactured by the family
necessary for family use, carpeting for all family rooms in use; one table;
books not to exceed seventy-five dollars in value; two saddles and their
appurtenances; two bridles, six chairs, or so many as does not exceed ten
dollars in value; one cradle; poultry on hand, not to exceed one hundred
dollars in value; ten head of sheep, not to exceed twenty-five dollars in
value; all wearing apparel; sufficient provisions including breadstuff and
animal products, to sustain the family for one year; provender suitable
for livestock, if there is any livestock, not to exceed seventy-five dollars
in value, or if such provender is not on hand, such other property as
does not exceed the sum in value; washing apparatus, not to exceed
seventy-five dollars in value; one sewing machine; all family portraits
and pictures; one cooking stove and appurtenances; cooking utensils, not
to exceed twenty-five dollars in value.
(2) Ninety per cent of the salary, wages of income earned by labor, of
3 3 Mont. Rev. Code § 93-5816 (1947).
3 4 Wash. Rev. Code § 7.32.280 (1956).3 5 Wyo. Stat. tit. 1, § 1-422 (1957).36 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 23.180 (1962).
97 Alaska Stat. § 9.35,080 (1962).
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every person earning a salary, wages or income of seventy-five dollars or
less per month. The lien created by service of garnishment, execution, or
attachment shall only effect ten per cent of such salary, wages or income
earned at the time of service of process.
(3) Sixty-seven dollars and fifty cents per month of the salary, wages, or
income earned by labor, of any person earning a salary, wages or income
in excess of seventy-five dollars per month.38
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has declared that the purpose of
the statute is "to allow the housekeeper with a family to retain certain
property free from molestation or appropriation by creditors to the
end that he and his family would thereby be extended an opportunity
of self support and not become a burden upon the public."9 In view
of its purpose it is to be liberally construed,40 but the legislature did
not intend to allow the debtor any luxury.41 However, while these
judicial pronouncements state a desired purpose, analysis of the
present statute discloses several defects which make it ineffective to
accomplish these ends.
Initially it should be noted that the statute has been essentially the
same since 1893. There have been no substantial amendments since
that time. Originally the wage exemption was fifty dollars.42 The
present provision was adopted in 1910.43 The personal property
provision has undergone two changes. There was a deletion of one
provision44 and a limitation placed upon another.45 The inference to
be drawn from this stagnant evolution is that the statute has lost its
utility. This fact becomes clearer when specific defects are brought
into focus.
Obviously the statute was adopted at a time when the state was still
predominantly an agricultural community. Yet, even if the economic
structure of the state were the same today, the statute would still not
accomplish its purpose. This conclusion is based primarily upon the
belief that the enumeration of exempt property fails to include several
items necessary for practical farm operation while including others
which are out of date. The farmer today is in need of exemptions
which will insure his ability to raise ,prepare, and transport his tobacco
and other crops to market in an efficient manner. He is no longer self-
supporting to as great an extent as before. He sells much of what he
produces in a community market and buys much of what he consumes
3SKy. Rev. Stat. § 427.010 (1962).39 Wallins Nat'l Bank v. Turner, 221 Ky. 562, 563, 299 S.W. 194, 195 (1927).
40 Id. at 564, 299 S.W. at 195.
41 Thomson v. Dennis' Ex'x, 282 Ky. 352, 355, 138 S.W.2d 490, 491 (1940).42 Ky. Acts 1893, ch. 219, IV, § 5.
4 3 Ky. Acts 1910, ch. 120, § 1.
44 Ibid.45 Ky. Acts 1930, ch. 10.
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at ordinary mercantile stores. Therefore, should an exemption statute,
keeping in mind its purpose, include modem farm equipment in com-
mon use today? If so, then the present statute is defective, as it fails
to include even the most common of such equipemnt as the tractor
and the farm truck.
Furthermore, some of the exemptions still essential for a farmer's
use are burdened by limits which do not reflect present economic
values. For example, if six chairs are necessary then the ten dollar
limit on their value should be abolished; or if ten sheep and provender
suitable for livestock are necessary, the twenty-five and seventy dollar
limits on these items should be stricken.
Another defect is magnified by increasing urban population. While
Kentucky may not have enjoyed the industrial expansion which has
occurred in other states, there has been some development or industry
with a corresponding increase in the number of urban dwellers. Due
largely to credit financing, there is apt to be a substantial number of
debtors residing in these areas. Thus, the question becomes whether
the present statute affords these people the protection necessary to
prevent them from becoming public burdens. Analysis quickly leads
to the conclusion that it does not.
The present provision does exempt several items which are neces-
sary to the urban debtor's daily life. Among these are wearing
apparel, sufficient provision for one year, and a cooking stove. Further-
more, the provision exempting "beds, bedding, and furniture sufficient
for family use" can be liberally construed to include other necessary
furnishings. However, the statute is still defective because of its
inclusion of out of date limitations upon certain items, and the exclu-
sion of other necessary items.
The limitation of seventy-five dollars on any washing machine
illustrates an outdated limitation. Granting that the debtor needs to
be able to retain a washing machine, should debtors have it subjected
to execution simply because they happen to possess one worth over
seventy-five dollars? To illustrate how the statute excludes items
which are necessary from its protection, consider the following situa-
tion. A commercial photographer with a family is in debt. His work
consists of taking commercial advertising photographs at various loca-
tions throughout a metropolitan area. He owns his camera and
depends upon his automobile for transportation, since he must photo
graph at places inaccessible by public transportation. Should a judg-
ment creditor be able to execute against this man's camera and auto-
mobile to satisfy his judgment? Certainly this is not a desirable situa-
tion, but the present statute would not protect him.
[Vol. 52,
An even more serious defect exists in the wage provisions of the
statute. That defect is the unrealistic amount exempted if the debtor
should earn seventy-five dollars or more per month. Sixty-seven dol-
lars and fifty cents is not sufficient to support any person for a month's
time. The figure appears more ridiculous when it is considered that
so many debtors have families dependent upon them.
For the purpose of discussion consider the following situation. A
judgment creditor seeks to satisfy a substantial judgment by resorting
to garnishment of a debtor's wages. The debtor has no savings and is
dependent upon the wages to support himself, his wife, and his minor
child. The judgment may be satisfied by garnishment of all the
debtor's wages for the entire year and this is what the creditor seeks to
do, Under the present statute the debtor would be entitled to a total
exemption for the year of eight hundred dollars. With this amount,
would he be able to provide even the basic necessities of food, housing,
clothing, and medical care? That he would not, is easily demonstrated.
For example, as long ago as 1950 the average wage earner with two de-
pendents living in Louisville spent 1,144 dollars for food, 369 dollars
for clothing, and 175 dollars for medical care.40 With the inflation
spiral which has taken place since 1950, our debtor should face an
even more impossible situation today. Perhaps this example is an
extreme case, but it is useful to show that the present wage exemption
is unrealistic and inadequate when viewed in light of its declared
purpose. Should it remain unchanged, there will continue to exist the
present situation of a legislature which has indicated it favors an
exemption, but is unwilling to enact a really effective statute.
A final defect requires little discussion to demonstrate. It is found
in the first sentence of the statute, which provides that only "a person
with a family resident in this state" is entitled to claim the exemption.
It is difficult to rationalize any conceivable policy which might under-
lie such a provision. It only serves to limit the scope of the statute's
protection and thereby obstructs its purpose. This is true because
there are many single persons residing in the state who, in the absence
of statutory protection, can become public burdens. Therefore, the
statute should be changed to extend at least wage protection to them.
SoM RECOMvMNDATIONS
Having considered what other states have done, how Kentucky
compares, the major defects which exist, and the need for reform,
possible solutions may now be presented.
46 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bul. No. 1097, June 1953, Table 2, p. 22.
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Exemption laws have been the subject of concern in a good number
of law review commentaries, but many of these were a result of the
depression era and recent comment of a comprehensive nature is quite
sparse. Yet three such articles have appeared within the last decade. 47
The basic theme of these is the need to protect the debtor without
prejudice towards the creditor, by means of a statute which will not
become quickly obsolete. Further, it is agreed that the best avenue
available in the personal property area is to allow the debtor to retain
the property he desires to a maximum dollar value. The recommenda-
tion in the wage area advocates a minimum exemption coupled with a
percentage of all in excess of that figure. However, there is disagree-
ment on the question of a maximum limit.
Solutions of a recent nature in the states have accepted" and
rejected" these views, but in general the states which have acted
approached the problem by diverse methods. For example, both
Connecticutu0 and South Carolina 1 have recently enacted new wage
statutes. Comparing them it is found that the former puts the ex-
emption at the discretion of the court, while the latter has abolished
the right.
These observations bring the discussion to the final consideration
of what might be done in Kentucky. Its determination ultimately must
rest with the legislature, but a few suggestions will be made. The
first of these is that, before any action whatever is taken in this state,
a study of the various exemption laws of other states would be made.
Even though the various exemption laws are deficient in common
ideas, they do provide a wide range of possibilities which may be
valuable. The legislature then would have a concise and accessible
store of every avenue utilized thus far, and would be better able to
proceed in a more informed and selective manner.
Secondly, there should be an initial consideration of which interest
involved is to be preferred. It is almost impossible to draft a neutral
statute. Consequently, the wisdom of pro-debtor and pro-creditor
policies should be re-evaluated, the ramifications of each considered,
47 Abrahams and Feldman, The Exemption of Wages from Garnishment:
Some Comparisons and Comments, 3 DePaul L. Rev. 153 (1954); Joslin, Debtors
Exemption Laws: Time for Modernization, 34 Ind. L.J. 355 (1959); Rombauer,
Debtor's Exemption Laws-Revision Ideas, 36 Wash. L. Rev. 484 (1961).48La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13.8881 (1) (1960). This provision exempts eighty
per cent of the wages due and provides a one hundred dollar minimum.
49 Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 246, § 28 (Supp. 1962). An amendment of the
wage statute changed the amount of the exemption, but retained the providing
of a dollar amount as the method of granting it, thus rejecting the view of those
who favor a percentage method.
50 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-361 (Supp. 1961).
51 S.C. Code § 10-1731 (Supp. 1960).
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the interests balanced, and a feasible course selected. Only after such
a deliberation can a statute be drafted which provides just results
towards all parties concerned.
Thirdly, a totally new statute is needed to replace the present one.
The defects previously emphasized justify this conclusion. What is the
best method? If the debtor is to be preferred, and it is hoped he
would, specific exemption requirements should not be included. As
noted earlier there seems to be no valid reason for them, and they
merely serve to hamper the effectiveness of the statutes.
Passing to a determination of what type of personal property pro-
vision should be adopted, none of the three basic structures in use
appears to be wholly satisfactory. The group (1) statutes include
certain items in their enumeration which become quickly obsolete in
our rapidly changing society. The group (2) statutes are more desir-
able, as they allow any item to be exempt, thus providing desired
flexibility in this respect. However, the dollar value limit they specify
can become inadequate within a few years, and unless the legislature
is willing to amend this amount when necessary, this type statute also
becomes relatively ineffective within a short time. Where the statute
provides an enumeration of specific items plus a general dollar value
exemption, the same problems arise. Nevertheless, it appears that these
group (8) statutes are cloest to an adequate solution.
Our statute should be amended to provide for the exemption of
broad categories or property accompanied by an exemption of addi-
tional property selected by the debtor to a maximum dollar value.
Some examples of the broad categories proposed are provisions
exempting a mechanized vehicle, or all appliances not of a recreational
nature. While this type of statute would require official interpretation,
it would preserve both flexibility and utility. The categories could be
sufficiently broad to encompass new items as they develop and
replace those now in use, and the added dollar value, even though it
might become outdated, could be easily amended. Lastly, such a
statute allows a liberal construction, which is desirable in view of an
exemption's purpose.
A somewhat new approach is also recommended in drafting a
different wage provision, as none of the basic structures in use is
wholly desirable. The statutes in group (1) which exempt a dollar
amount are not desirable, as they become rapidly obsolete in our
inflationary economy. Those which exempt a percentage are much
more desirable, as they easily adapt to economic change; but, unless
they are coupled with a minimum amount, some debtors who earn a
meager living receive insufficient protection. To illustrate, consider
1964] NOTE~S
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those who are not able to work full time and who earn one hundred
fifty dollars per month. Assume the statute provides a flat fifty per
cent exemption of all wages due at the time the creditor seeks to
satisfy his claim. Under the statute the debtor would only be able
to retain seventy-flve dollars of his month's salary. Clearly such a
result is insufficient to meet his needs. Yet, even if the statute should
provide a minimum dollar exemption, it would become obsolete with
the passage of time.
Furthermore, the statutes in group (1) which exempt, in effect, all
the debtor's wages for a certain period of time, and those in group (3)
which prohibit any levy against the debtor's wages, are also undesir-
able in that they are unfair towards creditors. This position is based
upon a belief that the most functional means a creditor may use to
obtain repayment of a debt should not be denied him in view of the
indispensable role he plays in our present economic system of credit
financing. Thus, while the debtor is to be preferred, both interests
should be balanced, and the scales not tipped so far as to be unjust.
Lastly, the statutes in group (2) offer no solution to the fact that the
dollar amount above and below which so much is exempt is quickly
out of date.
The solution that is recommehaded combines a commonly used
device with a novel suggestion. It is to provide a percentage exemp-
tion of the desired amount in addition to a minimum exemption of a
dollar amount which is dependent upon a current economic indicator
to determine. For example, such a statute could provide that the
minimum amount exempted should increase or decrease a certain
amount based upon the changes in the cost of living index. The
additional percentage allowed would then be added to this figure to
determine the net exemption. Linking the minimum exemption to a
current economic indicator would avoid the need for amendment of
this figure to meet changing values. The additional percentage
allowed, if sufficient now, would remain so as a percentage only; that
is, different totals and not a different proportionate amount. The net
effect of such a statute would be to provide flexibility without
obsolescence, and while practical problems might be met in linking
the minimum to the indicator, there would be an effective result.
CONCLUSION
Exemption laws have undergone radical change in various states.
The need is clear in Kentucky for at least a re-evaluation of these two
particular exemptions as they now exist. The recommendations made
[Vol. 52,
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are by no means comprehensive, but they do point up some possible
areas of inquiry. However, if the legislature is willing to recognize the
need, to consider what has been done in other states, and to take some
positive step toward reform, this is all that can be asked.
Paul D. Gudgel
